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Abstract—Industrial Control Networks (ICN) such as Su-
pervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are
widely used in industries for monitoring and controlling phys-
ical processes. These industries include power generation and
supply, gas and oil production and delivery, water and waste
management, telecommunication and transport facilities. The
integration of internet exposes these systems to cyber threats.
The consequences of compromised ICN are determine for a coun-
try economic and functional sustainability. Therefore, enforcing
security and ensuring correctness operation became one of the
biggest concerns for Industrial Control Systems (ICS), and need
to be addressed. In this paper, we propose an anomaly detection
approach for ICN using the physical properties of the system.
We have developed operational baseline of electricity generation
process and reduced the feature set using greedy and genetic
feature selection algorithms. The classification is done based on
Support Vector Machine (SVM), k-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN), and
C4.5 decision tree with the help from the inter-arrival curves.
The results show that the proposed approach successfully detects
anomalies with a high degree of accuracy. In addition, they
proved that SVM and C4.5 produces accurate results even for
high sensitivity attacks when they used with the inter-arrival
curves. As compared to this, k-NN is unable to produce good
results for low and medium sensitivity attacks test cases.
Index Terms—Industrial Control Networks, SCADA, Machine
Learning, Anomaly Detection, Support Vector Machine, k-
Nearest Neighbor, Decision Tree, Inter-Arrival Curves.
I. INTRODUCTION
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) is a
type of Industrial Control Systems (ICS). SCADA is used
to monitor, supervise, and control the industrial processes.
It is in use for several decades and plays an important role
in operation of many industries. SCADA is responsible for
monitoring and controlling the industrial process to ensure a
continuous operation, and the safety of the plant and human
beings. SCADA system involves the data transfer between a
central SCADA control center, Remote Terminal Units (RTU),
Programmable Logic Control (PLC), and operator terminals.
Note that tracing the transferred data helps in providing
information about the status of the monitored system.
The evolution of SCADA system proceeded in three genera-
tion. In the first generation, SCADA systems were isolated net-
work and have neither connection with computer networks nor
other standard systems. They used proprietary protocols for
communication with a very limited connectivity. The commu-
nication capabilities were enhanced in the second generation
through the integration with local area network. The current
SCADA system, also known as Internet-based SCADA, uses
standard networking protocols commercial products. Internet
and Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems are fully
integrated with the current generation SCADA systems.
The security of the industrial control systems is critical
for plant operations and safety. Any disruption in the ser-
vices monitored and supervised through ICS has adverse
consequences. Typical services include power generation and
distribution, water treatment plant, and nuclear facilities. Tra-
ditionally, SCADA systems are believed to be secure from
external threats as they are not linked to external networks
and used proprietary protocols. However, the introduction of
Internet and commercial applications have exposed SCADA
systems to security threats although that they provided numer-
ous benefits to SCADA systems [1]. Furthermore, the most
prevalent SCADA communication protocols have inherent
security weaknesses due to the lack of authentication, integrity
check, and encryption [2]. These weaknesses can be exploited
to gain unauthorized access, overwrite running configuration,
and execute Denial of Service (DoS) and Man-In-The-Middle
(MITM) attacks. The discovery of the Stuxnet malware, which
was used to attack the nuclear plant in Iran, also exposes these
security weaknesses. In this incident, hardcoded authentication
credentials were used to compromise connection between
operators station, PLC, and monitored equipments.
The security measures of data network are usually applied
to ICNs which includes firewalls, Intrusion Detection System
(IDS), and Anomaly Detection System (ADS). However, the
data network and ICN are very different from each other. Thus,
there is a need for the development of special security product
for industrial control networks. Generally, industrial control
networks have strict timing requirements and regular sequence
of operations [3]. This makes ICNs more predictable which
can be exploited in the development of ADS. It has also been
believed by many researchers that ADS is more favorable than
rule-based detection methods [4]. However, the problem with
ADS is the high number of false positives. In addition, as
anomaly detection is done by developing normal profile of
operations, a patient attacker can alter the normal profile by
long undetected attacks. These modifications make the attacks
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acceptable to ADS.
The proposed ADS tackles both of the previously men-
tioned challenges using sliding window trim mean and de-
veloped equation for determining the thresholds. We have
considered attacks that can corrupt the normal command and
response messages between the controlling station and the
controlled process. In other words, we have assumed that an
attacker can compromise command and response messages.
This assumption is valid due to the lack of authentication,
integrity checking, and replay attack detection in prevalent
SCADA communication protocols. The compromising of these
messages includes changing the values of the parameters
in response or command. This corruption can disturb the
operation of the process and force an equipment to operate
in a danger zone. Preventing the system from operate in a
danger zone is one of proposed ADS goals.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II discusses the vulnerabilities in industrial control systems.
The related work and introduction to power generation process
are provided in section III. The implementation details of this
work is discussed in section IV. The experimental work is
deliberated in section V. The accuracy, false positive, and
attack detection rate results and their analysis are presented
in section VI. Section VII concludes the paper.
II. VULNERABILITIES IN INDUSTRIAL CONTROL SYSTEMS
The integration of the latest information and communica-
tion technologies into ICS enhances its functionalities and
connectivity. Nowadays, industrial control systems are tightly
integrated with Internet and use the same network used by
other TCP/IP devices. This integration exposes these systems
to all vulnerabilities of the information and communication
technologies [5]. In addition, ICS used to have proprietary soft-
ware but current ICS uses commercial software with known
vulnerabilities such as Microsoft Windows and SQL. Beside
these vulnerabilities, communication protocols and infrastruc-
ture of ICS lack basic security mechanism such as authentica-
tion and integrity checks. These vulnerabilities expose ICS to
multitude of threats which can result in catastrophic events.
In this section, we discuss security vulnerabilities in ICS
infrastructure and communication protocols and their impacts
when exploited.
A. ICS Communication Protocol Vulnerabilities
The communication protocols of ICS are designed to ensure
availability, reliability, and timely execution of tasks. Most
industrial control communication protocols are designed and
developed when the security was not the prime concern.
This results in the inherent security vulnerabilities in these
protocols. Basic security features such as authentication, in-
tegrity check, and time checks are missing in ICS commu-
nication protocols. Exploiting these vulnerabilities results in
compromising the system and providing complete control to
the attacker. The authors in [6] presented the vulnerabilities
of two major communication protocols for industrial control
system; MODBUS and DNP 3.0. Although the vulnerabilities
are specific to these protocols, they are common among other
communication protocols as well. These vulnerabilities can
be exploited to compromise integrity and safety as well as
launch DoS and man in the middle attacks. Several attacks on
industrial control systems have been reported in [7].
B. Supervisory Layer Vulnerabilities
An operator system is used to monitor and supervise indus-
trial process. A compromised operator station has proven to be
lethal. This is one of entry points for an attacker to launch an
attack. The followings are possible threats and vulnerabilities
in an operator system: i) The operator workstation has evolved
into PCs and based on Windows Platform. It is known that
Windows platform has high number of known vulnerabilities
and unpatched PC can be easily exploited [8]. ii) The system
can also be compromised due to weak passwords, installation
of unauthorized software, connection to internet and absence
or obsolete Anti-Virus. iii) The use of commodity hardware
and software solution such as Microsoft Windows, TCP/IP net-
working, and SQL database exposes industrial control systems
to same vulnerabilities of these products [9]. This adoption
is mainly due to their low cost, high availability, and high
connectivity requirements.
C. Field Layer Vulnerabilities
Remote terminal units are responsible for managing field
devices. On the other hand, programmable logic control is
commonly used to control filed devices and gather telemetric
data. PLCs are programmed by using software such as STEP 7
by Siemens. The potential for reprogramming an RTU or PLC
by accessing the polling/communication circuit exists. The
attacker can replace the valid configuration file by malicious
file. This threat could be exploited in case of PLC without
providing the means for authentication or having hardcoded
username and password in the firmware.
III. RELATED WORK
The security of SCADA system can be achieved by two
approaches. The first approach considers securing the perime-
ter of SCADA network by firewalls, IDS and host based IDS,
or anti-virus. However, the previously mentioned technologies
are insufficient in securing SCADA systems due to the unique
nature of SCADA systems gaps [10]. On the other hand, the
second approach is to develop profiles of normal operations
and detect intrusions using these profiles [11]. The second
approach can be further divided on the basis of feature sets
used in developing these normal operations’ profiles. The
feature sets can be related to protocol parameters, network
traffic patterns, or measurements from physical processes such
as pressure, speed, and power.
An anomaly based IDS to detect intrusion by establishing
network traffic flow model and relationship between them
is proposed in [11]. The proposed IDS is intended to au-
tomatically generates flow models and detect anomalies in
network traffic that violate the established traffic flow model.
It is potential to generate all possible traffic flow in SCADA
network because of the limited number of devices, protocols
and regular communication patterns. The implementation and
results of proposed IDS is presented in [12] along with the
challenges in modeling SCADA traffic. The authors used
traditional five tuple protocol number, source and destination
IP addresses, and port numbers to generate network traffic flow
information. They used invariants for analyzing the SCADA
network traffic. These invariants include diurnal pattern of
activities which describe the network traffic based on time
and weekdays. In addition, they include lognormal connection
sizes and heavy-tail distributions which describe connection
size distribution and self-similarity. The results shown that
SCADA network have regular and periodic patterns in nature,
and both lognormal and heavy-tail do not provide good fit
for the SCADA connection size. The authors mentioned that
existing traffic models cannot be easily applied to SCADA
traffic.
A neural network based intrusion detection system is pro-
posed in [13] for SCADA lab system for water tank storage.
The proposed IDS uses four features as an input parameters
to represent the physical state of the system; water level,
command response frequency, mode of operation, and water
tank pump state. The proposed attack model consists of com-
mand and response injection and DoS attacks which affect the
integrity and the availability aspect of the SCADA network,
respectively. The results shown that the proposed IDS is able to
achieve high accuracy for detecting DoS attacks and command
and response injection attacks but with high percentage of
false positive in detecting replay attacks. The proposed IDS
approach is designed for water storage tank with a simple
process of monitoring. In such away, the IDS accuracy may
degraded if it is applied to more complex system.
Alavaro et al. [14] presented that incorporating physical
system knowledge enables the identification of critical sensors
and the attacks on them. They modeled Tennessee-Eastman
Process Control System (TE-PCS) which is responsible for
controlling a chemical reaction with primary objective of
maintaining pressure around 3000 kPa. The proposed detection
method is based on change detection with the use of cumula-
tive sum which detects the change between two hypotheses in
minimum possible time. Three types of attacks, namely surge,
bias and geometric, are modeled and launched on different
sensors in the network. They found that denial of service
attacks do not force the control system to operate in unsafe
condition. However, the attacks on integrity of sensor force
the change in pressure beyond safety limits. An automatic
detection module is also proposed which replaces the sensor
measurements by estimated measurements using linear model
of system when an intrusion is detected.
In [15], two approaches to enhance the accuracy of anomaly
detection in SCADA systems have been discussed. The first
approach is based on n-gram technique which records the
normal operation of the SCADA network. The second ap-
proach is based on the invariant induction which establishes
mathematical relationship between different data readings and
uses these relationships to model the normal operation of the
electric network. It detects the corrupted measurement due to
fault or attack by evaluating it against mathematical model.
The authors used load flow program to record real and reactive
power flow measurements of six buses electric network of
varying load for one year period. They introduced 1 to 44
random errors in the calculated data files. They concluded that
invariant induction has better overall performance, while n-
gram is better in detecting corrupt files. It is also suggested to
use correlation of two or more anomaly detection techniques
for further enhanced accuracy.
A Bayesian based correlation technique is used to extended
the work discussed in [15] by correlate the output of two IDS
[16]. The authors used invariant induction and artificial ant
approach based IDS to reduce false positives. They defined
three invariant checkers for profiling and anomaly detection,
a linear invariant checker, range checker, and a bus-zero-sum
checker. The artificial ant approach is adopted by clustering
real and reactive powers to define normal operation of electric
network by using Bayesian based correlation.
An anomaly detection system based on data rough set theory
[17] is mentioned in [18] for securing the electric power
system. The proposed approach profiles the normal operation
by extracting rules from the normal operation and compare
incoming measurements from remote terminal units with the
normal profile. The authors have reduced the number of rules
for anomaly detection which makes the rule dynamic and less
resources intensive. The experimentation is done on the six bus
power system, the data set consists of reading 45 tests with
57 measurement values. The errors are introduced on bus 4
and bus 6; the authors only introduce switch sign error in the
dataset. The rules for detection anomalies are based on the
power flow between the buses on the electrical network.
Similar to data networks, the normal profiling can also be
done by using features from network protocol, traffic patterns,
and client server response. There is considerable amount of
research done for ICN security based on these concepts. In
[19], intrusion detection systems that modeled the specification
of the MODBUS/TCP are discussed. The authors in [20]
exploited the static nature of control system network topology
and network traffic pattern. They proposed three techniques
to detect intrusions on the control network. The first approach
based on the protocol specification of the fields in the request
and reply messages of MODBUS/TCP. They have developed
specification for function codes, exception codes, protocol
identifiers and cross field relationship specification such as
the relationship between the length and the function code. The
second approach exploits the predictable communication pat-
tern in control systems, snort [21] is used to detect suspicious
communication patter. The snort rules are developed based on
the modeled communication pattern in MODBUS/TCP based
network. In the third approach, they used heuristics to learn the
availability of the server and clients on the system which helps
in identifying rogue devices and changing network services.
Hui Lin et al. [22] proposed an intrusion detection system
for DNP 3 protocol which uses Bro IDS [23]. Bro IDS is a
network analysis framework. The proposed system modified
Bro and consists of three main components; a network parser,
an event handler, and a policy script interpreter which has
Protocol Validation Policy (PVP). The network packet parser is
responsible for decoding incoming packet. The event handler
acts as an interface between DNP3 parser and the policy
script interpreter. Event handlers are specified for each type
of data field of DNP3 protocol. PVP is responsible to look
for protocol specification violations, it performs two types of
validation; inter-packet validation, and intra-packet validation.
In inter-packet validation, it looks for anomalous communica-
tion patterns such as unmatched request/reply. The system can
keep the history of states from parsed network packets. This
type of validation helps in detecting DoS and replay attacks.
The intra-packet validation validates the dependencies between
different data fields to detect malformed packets which causes
DoS, an anomalous packet has mismatch of length field and
actual length of the real pay load. The authors have conducted
robustness and throughput testing in the experiments but do
not test the proposed system for malicious activity.
The authors in [24] proposed a sliding window based
anomaly detection framework. The proposed framework uses
a specific form of arrival curves, denoted as inter-arrival
curves, for analyzing discrete event traces, which helps in
performing a better detection of abnormal behavior of the
real-time embedded systems. The proposed framework uses
the input trace to calculate two special types of inter-arrival
curves; maximum inter-arrival curve (Cmax), and minimum
inter-arrival curve (Cmin). During classification phase, the
classifier used the obtained features Cmax and Cmin from the
tested trace to evaluate their conformance to the corresponding
features obtained from the set of known traces in the training
model. The classification framework considers the behavior
of an event to be anomalous when its Cmax, Cmin, or
both are anomalous. The proposed approach only considers
events occurring within a defined time step, which means that
their exact occurrence time are neglected. This implies that
anomalies affecting events timing are not detected by inter-
arrival curves based framework. In addition, min and max
inter-arrival curves are unable to detect anomalies which have
a slight perturbation to the event trace.
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
This section discusses the developed anomaly detection
technique for industrial control system in power generation
sector. In this area, most of the work has been done in security
of power distribution networks only. The proposed anomaly
detection system uses artificial intelligence techniques such as
support vector machine, k-nearest neighbor, and C4.5 decision
tree for power generation process. In addition, it uses the inter-
arrival curves for better detection of abnormal behavior of
industrial control systems.
Industrial control systems are often implemented to perform
a recurrent behavior. Thus, the generated event traces by
these systems are expected to reflect such a recurrence. This
allows for analyzing the system behavior with respect to
an expected behavior. Moreover, ICS equipments operate in
predefined ranges, such kind of operations are easily to profile.
The proposed anomaly detection system has a dual detection
frameworks that detects abnormal behavior by analyzing both
the equipments readings with their thresholds as well as the
discrete event traces generated by the industrial control system.
A. Threshold-Based Anomaly Detection
In power generation process, the equipments operate in
predefined ranges, such kind of operations are easily to pro-
file. An anomaly is defined as any reading which violates
these normal profiles. The following subsections illustrate the
classification techniques considered in the proposed anomaly
detection system for ICS.
1) Support Vector Machine (SVM):
A support vector machine is a supervised machine learning
system that has been widely employed for intrusion detection
[25]. It classifies the input vectors into two-classes or multi-
classes. In this research, we are considering two classes; nor-
mal class and anomalous class. The normal class is represented
by +1 while the anomalous class is represented by -1. The
basic concept of SVM is to find a margin between the two
classes in a hyperplane. In addition, its main objective is
to maximize the margin which provides better generalization
ability [26]. The generalization ability is defined as classifier
accuracy for current and future data. The set of training vectors
that belongs to the considered two separate classes, normal and
attack classes, can be represented using Equation 1.
S =
{(
x1, y1
)
,
(
x2, y2
)
, .... ,
(
xl, yl
)}
(1)
where, xi ∈ Rn is a vector in the two classes, i = 1, 2, ..., l,
and y ∈ Rl is an indicator vector such that yi ∈ [+ 1, − 1]
The optimal separation hyperplane for the data points is
defined using Equation 2. The closest data points to the margin
are called support vectors. Note that if the training data can
be linearly separated, then there exists a pair ( #»w, b) for the
data points xi as shown in Equation 3 and Equation 4.
#»wTx+ b = 0 (2)
#»wTxi + b ≥ +1, xi ∈ Normal (3)
#»wTxi + b ≤ −1, xi ∈ Anomalous (4)
where, #»w is the weight vector, and b is the scalar (bias).
Therefore, the classification problem using the training
set can be estimated using function f : Rn 7→ {±1} as
represented in Equation 5.
f(x) =
{
+1 , #»wTx+ b ≥ +1
−1 , #»wTx+ b ≤ −1
(5)
The optimal separating hyperplane that provide the largest
margin between two classes can be found by minimizing
squared norm of separating hyperplane [27]. Hence, the hy-
perplane that optimally separates the data is the one that
minimizes Φ which can be calculated using Equation 6.
Φ =
‖ #»w‖2
2
(6)
If the data points are not linearly separable, the margin
may be negative. In this case, SVM employ the concept of
soft margin which relax the requirement of Equation 3 and
Equation 4. The second approach is to use the kernel which
linearize the data points to make them separable.
We utilize SVM in this research due to its good general-
ization ability of the learning model. This implies that good
accuracy can be achieved even with relatively smaller training
datasets with SVM. Another advantage of SVM is its ability
to handle a large number of features. In addition, SVM also
ensures high accuracy for classification of future data from
the same allotment to which the training data belongs [26].
Moreover, SVMs are free from the problem of over-fitting.
Experimental results obtained confirm high accuracy of attack
detection and insignificant false positive rates for the proposed
approach.
2) K-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN):
The k-nearest neighbor algorithm is a well-known machine
learning methodology characterized by a good performance
and a short training period [28]. K-NN is considered as a
type of the non-parametric classifiers and special case of the
instance-based classifiers [29]. The working principle of the
k-NN algorithm based on the assumption that instances of the
same class generally lie in close to each other. The label of
the unknown instance can be determined by examining the
class of the closest neighbors. K-NN classifier is trained with
the labelled training objects. Then, the classification of the
test object is done by computing the approximate distance
or the similarity between the test object and the training
objects. The objective of the distance metric is to minimize
the distance between two points of same class, while maximize
the distance between different classes. The distance determines
the nearest neighbor to the test object. Subsequently, the class
of the k-nearest neighbor is assigned to the test object. The
most common distance calculation methods are Euclidean and
Manhattan [30] as shown in Equation 7 and Equation 8,
respectively.
d(x, y) =
√√√√ n∑
i=0
(xi − yi)2 (7)
d(x, y) =
n∑
i=0
|xi − yi| (8)
where, x is the vector to be classified, y is the trained vector,
and n is the dimensional space.
Furthermore, other distance calculation methods could be
used for specific problems. Euclidean distance method is used
in the proposed ADS. To enhance the accuracy of the k-NN,
weighting scheme is used to influence the distance measure-
ment and voting of each instance. In the k-NN, the value of k
is an important parameter since it determines the number of
neighbors to be included in the nearest neighbor list. Smaller
value of k makes the scheme sensitive to noise whereas larger
value will include objects from other classes. In other words,
the accurate choice of k enhances the performance of the
algorithm. The optimal value of the k can be obtained by
cross-validation technique [31]. In this research, the value of
k is set to be equal to 1 according to the results of the cross-
validation which is also appropriate for small datasets [32].
The main advantage of k-NN methods is their simplicity
and lack of parametric assumptions. These methods perform
surprisingly well, especially when each class is characterized
by multiple combinations of predictor values as in the case
of the dataset used in this research work. For instance, an
anomalous behavior can be characterized by one, three or five
parameters in the used dataset.
3) C4.5 Decision Tree:
C4.5 [33] is one the most popular tree classifiers. C4.5
algorithm forms a decision tree to describe the classifier and
uses the decision tree to produce the rule set. Due to the
distributed nature of information about a single class in a tree,
it may be difficult to interpret complex decision trees. As such,
C4.5 uses groups of if-then rules for each class to classify a
case [34]. The first rule that matches the conditions outlined
by a case classifies that case. In case no matching rule occurs,
C4.5 assigns a default class to the case.
The initial, unpruned, decision tree forms the C4.5 rule
sets. Each path from the root of the tree to a leaf becomes
a prototype rule whose conditions are the outcomes along the
path and whose class is the label of the leaf. To simplify the
rule, the consequence of discarding each condition is studied.
Dropping a condition may result in rise the instances in the
instance set of cases covered by the rule, and the number
of errors of cases that do not belong to the class nominated
by the rule, and may lower the pessimistic error rate. The
optimal pessimistic error rate is found by dropping conditions
using a hill-climbing algorithm [35]. To finalize the process,
C4.5 picks a subset of simplified rules for each class and sorts
them to minimize the error on the training cases. In addition,
it chooses a default class. As a result, the obtained rule set
usually has far fewer rules than the number of leaves on the
unpruned decision tree.
B. Event-Based Anomaly Detection
The proposed anomaly detection framework uses a specific
form of arrival curves [36], denoted as inter-arrival curves [24],
for analyzing discrete event traces, which helps in performing
a better detection of abnormal behavior of the industrial
control systems. The proposed framework uses the input event
trace to calculate two special types of inter-arrival curves;
maximum inter-arrival curve (Cmax) and minimum inter-
arrival curve (Cmin). Cmax provides the maximum counts for
occurrences of event e within the sliding windows. However,
Cmin represents the corresponding minimum counts of event
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Fig. 1. Maximum and minimum inter-arrival curves for e = B.
e within the sliding window. Note that the sliding window
always start with the considered event e to optimize the com-
putation of inter-arrival curves, and the length of the sliding
windows varies between one and the maximum window size
threshold (Wδ). Cmin and Cmax can be calculated using
Equation 9 and Equation 10, respectively. The minimum and
the maximum inter-arrival curves can be affected by abnormal
behavior. Therefore, the proposed classification framework
uses these curves to detect and quantify such anomalies.
Cmin(T ) = argmin
w=1,2,...,Wδ
C(T,w) (9)
Cmax(T ) = argmax
w=1,2,...,Wδ
C(T,w) (10)
where, T is the event trace, arg is an abbreviation for
argument, C is the count function, w is the window size, and
Wδ is the window size threshold.
Consider the below event trace sample T . It contains 25
events of event types e ∈ {A,B,C,D,E}. The corresponding
minimum inter-arrival curve and maximum inter-arrival curve
for an event type B with Wδ of size 25 are shown in Figure 1.
T =
{
BBEBCABEABDBBBEBCBAABBBEB
}
Initially, a set of pairs of Cmin and Cmax for every
considered event e per each training trace were built during the
training phase. This phase basically requires a massive compu-
tation capabilities to compute the maximum and the minimum
inter-arrival curves as well as a lot of memory space to store
the huge sets of pairs. Therefore, the inter-arrival curves were
calculated only for significance percentage of an event type
e, feature events, within a trace to reduce the computation
during this phase. During the second phase, the framework
aggregated the similar minimum and maximum inter-arrival
curves applied to the same event e. The aggregation was
achieved by calculating a mean curves and a students t-test
confidence intervals for Cmin and Cmax independently at each
window size. In other words, the output of the second phase is
a training model composed of six inter-arrival curves per each
type of e event. The main advantages of aggregation method
are represented by its capability of reducing the required
allocation memory for the training model and its robustness
against outliers.
During classification phase, the classifier used the obtained
features, Cmin and Cmax, from the tested trace to evaluate
their conformance to the corresponding features obtained from
the set of known traces in the training model. Such an
evaluation was performed in an automated manner by applying
the Mann-Whitney U test [37]. The classification framework
considers the behavior of an event to be anomalous when
its Cmin, Cmax, or both are anomalous. If the minimum
or the maximum inter-arrival curve failed the Mann-Whitney
U test, the classifier performs further classification stage to
quantify the deviation of the failed curve from the training
model. It uses the tunable threshold for this purpose, the
tunable threshold is referred to as ςth. The inter-arrival curve
is declared to be normal if its deviation value is less than
ςth, even that it failed the statistical Mann-Whitney U test.
Otherwise, the inter-arrival curve is considered anomalous.
V. EXPERIMENTAL WORK
The proposed framework has a dual detection that relies on
the equipments readings with their thresholds and the inter-
arrival curves. The detection system will make use of data and
event traces, the data trace represents the equipments readings,
such as the electrical and temperature, at timing durations for
a given event trace. The system behavior is declared to be
normal if the event trace and the data trace pass the inter-
arrival curves test and the threshold-based test, respectively.
Otherwise, the behavior is considered anomalous. Not that
anomalies affecting events timing are detected by threshold-
based framework. In addition, min and max inter-arrival curves
are unable to detect anomalies which have a slight perturbation
to the event trace as we mentioned previously. In this case,
threshold-based anomaly detection framework takes care of
detecting such abnormal behaviour.
We have used data of a turbine-generator operation from
power generation plant. The purposed system uses threshold-
based anomaly detection as well as event-based anomaly
detection. The threshold is based on the operational limits
and the average of a parameter. The dataset is evaluated using
support vector machine, k-nearest neighbor, and C4.5 decision
tree for threshold-based anomaly detection.
A. Dataset and Feature Selection
The dataset is comprised of 18 parameters related to tem-
perature, pressure, electrical and safety indicators. The timing
is very strict so it is not feasible to use all the parameters to
identify anomalies. This is due to high incoming data rate and
timely execution of all the processes in industrial applications.
Feature selection is carried on dataset to reduce the number
of features to differentiate normal and anomalous industrial
operation. Genetic and exhaustive search algorithms are used
to identify important features in the dataset. Features that affect
the power output of the turbine-generator are selected using
feature selection algorithms. The feature space reduced from
18 to 5 important features only which greatly affect power
production. The selected features are as follows:
• Fuel Gas Flow (FGF): It is the amount of gas input to
the combustion chamber. Its value varies as per the power
requirement.
• Main Shaft Vibration (MSV): It is the shaft vibration
intensity. It is very important parameter, any great de-
viation from normal operation can persistently damage
the turbine-generator system.
• Gearbox Vibration (GBV): It is similar safety indicator
as main shaft vibration.
• Exhaust Gas Temperature (EGT): It is temperature of
turbine exhaust, which varies with the power output of the
generator. It needs to be monitored because excessive ex-
haust temperature can also damage the turbine-generator
system.
• Power: Several parameters such as compressor discharge
pressure, lube oil supply temperature directly affect
power output of a turbine-generator system. Therefore,
power is also selected to identify abnormal operations in
this process.
Each parameter of turbine-generator system should fall in
predefined range to ensure normal system operation. The
power requirement varies during different times of the day.
The static nature of these processes can be used to model
the normal operation behavior of the system. The baseline
parameters are established using the historical data from a
power generation plant. The dataset is divided based on dif-
ferent power demand patterns during different time intervals,
Figure 2 shows the average power demand during different
time intervals. The dataset divisions are as follows:
• Morning Dataset (MD): Data from the morning time
interval (06:00 AM - 12:00 PM).
• Afternoon Dataset (AD): Data from the afternoon time
interval (12:00 PM - 06:00 PM).
• Evening Dataset (ED): Data from the evening time inter-
val (06:00 PM - 12:00 AM).
• Night Dataset (ND): Data from the night time interval
(12:00 AM - 06:00 AM).
B. Testing Scenarios and Detection Sensitivity Degree (S%)
To evaluate the performance of the proposed ADS, six
testing scenarios are considered per dataset group. The dif-
ference between each testing scenario is based on the number
of parameters considered for anomaly detection and the total
number of parameters in the dataset. The testing scenarios
are divided into two classes; reduced dataset class and full
dataset class. The reduced dataset represents the datasets with
the parameters that are selected from the original dataset using
feature selection algorithms. The full dataset consists of all the
parameters in the original dataset. This is done to evaluate
the impact of the feature selection on the performance of
the proposed ADS. In addition, three scenarios are selected
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Fig. 2. Average power demand during different time intervals.
for each class based on the sensitivity degree of detecting
anomalies. These testing scenarios are classified as follows:
• Least Sensitive (S% = 20%): A dataset row is labeled
as an attack if all the selected parameters in the reduced
dataset are compromised. For the full dataset, the dataset
row is considered anomalous when all parameters are
compromised.
• Medium Sensitive (S% = 60%): A dataset row is labeled
anomalous when any three of the selected parameters in
the reduced dataset or any three parameters in the full
dataset are compromised.
• Highly Sensitive (S% = 100%): A dataset row is labeled
as an attack if any one of the parameters or the selected
parameters in the full dataset or the reduced dataset is
compromised.
The maximum, minimum, trim means, and thresholds values
are calculated for each parameter. Trim means are used instead
of the normal averages to exclude the outliers that affect the
average. This helps in protecting the normal profiles from an
attacker attempting to manipulate them by sending periodic
malicious values. It also protects the normal profiles from the
values coming from the system faults.
The difference percentage between the operational limit and
the trim mean is calculated using Equation 11. This percentage
is used to calculate the tolerance region between the trim mean
and the threshold. If the average value of a parameter is close
to its operational limit, its tolerance region will be smaller
as compared to a higher average value. For small tolerance
region, small variation will result in an anomaly behavior.
4 = |ψ − µ|
ψ
(11)
where, 4 is the percentage difference of the operational
limit and the trim mean, ψ is the operational limit, and µ is
the parameter trim mean.
Equation 12 is developed to determine the threshold for
each parameter. It should be noted that the threshold is not
static and incorporate the changing operational conditions. The
Fig. 3. Proposed approach architecture.
parameter is considered to be compromised if its value exceeds
the established threshold calculated using Equation 12.
Pth = µ · 4+ µ (12)
Sample rows of the used dataset with normal values for
the selected parameters are shown in Table I, whereas Ta-
ble II shows the anomalous values. These tables include the
operational limit of each parameter, the computed thresholds,
the normal values, and the anomalous values. The anomalous
values are shown in bold italic font in Table II.
For the event-based anomaly detection, the minimum and
the maximum inter-arrival curves are calculated and tested for
the events related to the considered parameters in the event
trace. The number of the considered events depends on the
TABLE I. Normal operation dataset.
Parameter
FGF MSV GBV EGT Power
ψ 500 45 5 560 1120
Pth 445 18.75 2.50 532 1032
Samples 329 10.51 1.43 469 918
319 11.62 1.56 416 834
362 10.90 1.40 433 800
371 12.42 1.60 458 819
TABLE II. Anomalous operation dataset.
Parameter
FGF MSV GBV EGT Power
ψ 500 45 5 560 1120
Pth 445 18.75 2.50 532 1032
Samples 484 12.636 1.365 470 884
474 10.998 1.425 547 1078
447 23.51 4.56 557 1103
value of S% when using the full dataset class. The most
significant 20% of the events are considered by the inter-arrival
curves anomaly detection when testing the least sensitive
scenario. On the other hand, 60% of the significant events
are tested by the event-based anomaly detection during the
medium sensitive scenario. However, the inter-arrival curves
for all events are generated and tested for the highly sensi-
tive scenario. The events related to the 5 important selected
features are considered by the inter-arrival curves anomaly
detection when using the reduced dataset class. Subsequently,
the event trace will be considered anomalous when all events,
any three events, and any event fail the inter-arrival curves test
for the least sensitive, medium sensitive, and highly sensitive
scenarios, respectively.
C. Performance Measures
The performance evaluation of the proposed system is done
using three important factors. The key performance indicators
include the Attack Detection Rate (ADR), the False Positive
Rate (FPR), and the System Accuracy (SA). The ADR, FPR,
and SA are calculated using Equation 13, Equation 14, and
Equation 15, respectively [38].
ADR =
Total No. of attacks
Total No. of detected attacks
× 100% (13)
FPR =
Total No. of misclassified Proc
Total No. of normal Proc
× 100% (14)
SA =
Total No. of right classified Proc
Total No. of Proc
× 100% (15)
The proposed anomaly detection system targets the classi-
fication problem through a framework whose architecture is
shown in Figure 3. Using the given training set of data and
event traces, which also known as training traces, the output of
the framework is a decision whether a test trace is conform-
ing to that training data; normal trace, or anomalous trace.
The framework uses the threshold-based anomaly detection
techniques as well as the inter-arrival curves for extracting the
high-level features from the data and event traces, respectively.
Subsequently, it builds a training model using these features
to reason about the corresponding features extracted from the
test trace.
VI. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
The dataset comprised of a one month of operational
data from the power generation process. The training of the
algorithms is done over 25% of a randomly selected data. The
smaller training set data is used because of the fewer number
of attack types, similar approach is used in [20] where minimal
training is done for the IDS. The data/event traces used in the
testing phase are different from the traces used for training the
algorithms. Each instance of the trained dataset is labelled as
normal or anomalous. The labeling of the training dataset is
done according to the following criteria, the normal activity
is represented by +1 while the anomalous is represented by
-1. The total of 18 features are used to train the classifier
algorithm in all features based anomaly detection, whereas 5
selected features by the feature selection algorithms are used
to train the algorithms in the reduced feature dataset based
anomaly detection.
The implementation of the algorithms is done through
CUDA C/C++ programming language on HPC K-20 GPU
cluster [39] to achieve the parallel computations which reduce
the computation time. The cluster is comprised of 32 IBM
System x3650 servers, dual Xeon E5 10-core 2.8 gigahertz
processors, NVIDIA K20 GPUs containing 2,496 cores each
on 12 of these nodes, with 64 gigabytes of memory.
The experiments tested the attack detection rate, the false
positive rate, and the accuracy factors among full dataset
and reduced feature input to the classifier algorithm. The
results of the experiments are presented for each type of the
attack sensitivity degree (i.e., least sensitive, medium sensitive,
and highly sensitive). The experimental results of each time
interval group are presented for each type of classification
algorithm along with their averages.
A. Support Vector Machine (SVM)
The experimental results of the proposed approach with S%
as 100% are summarized in Table III. The achieved average
accuracy with the reduced dataset is 87.8% whereas it is 71.3%
for full dataset based approach. Performance degradation was
observed for MD group as the detection accuracy dropped
to 80.6%. The minimum accuracy with full dataset based
approach is 57.8% for ND group. This low detection accuracy
is observed due to the similarity between the normal and
the anomalous data. The average attack detection rate for
reduced data set based approach is 85%. The full dataset
based approach achieved the maximum attack detection rate
of 55.6% with the average detection rate of 46.7%. The
TABLE III. SVM results for S% = 100%.
Full Dataset Reduced Dataset
MD AD ED ND MD AD ED ND
ADR 55.6 37.8 37.8 55.6 71.1 84.4 93.3 91.1
FPR 23.7 11.9 5.2 41.5 6.7 20.7 6.7 11.1
SA 71.1 75.6 80.6 57.8 87.8 80.6 93.3 89.4
average false positive rate with reduced dataset input is 11.3%
whereas with the full dataset it is 20.6%. ND group showed
the maximum false positive rate of 41.5% for the full dataset.
The experimental results improved greatly by increasing the
number of parameters, S% = 60%, for anomaly detection as
shown in Table IV. The ideal accuracy of 100% is achieved for
AD and ED groups with reduced dataset. The average accuracy
is also very close to ideal. Another benefit is ideal false
positive rate of zero across all groups. The attack detection
rate also improved from 85% to around 98%. The improved
results are due to improved discrimination criteria between
normal and anomalous data. Similar results are observed for
full dataset approach, its average accuracy increased to 92.1%
but its attack detection rate still very low. The maximum
achieved attack detection rate is 77.8% with average value of
68.9%. Similar to reduce dataset approach, the false positive
rate is very close to the ideal condition. In this approach,
increasing the parameter increase the accuracy and the false
positive rate but the attack detection rate still not appropriate
for industrial control systems. The poor attack detection rate
is due to the poor discriminating criteria which is due to weak
support vectors in hyperplane.
The ideal attack detection rate, accuracy, and false positive
rate are achieved for the least sensitive detection system across
all groups with reduced dataset as shown in Table V. The
difference between the normal and the anomalous classes is
very high because there is no similarity between them since all
the parameters are either anomalous or normal in a particular
row. This establishes optimal hyperplane between the normal
and the anomalous class. The results with the full dataset
also shows improvement. The average accuracy is improved to
96.7% with ideal false positive rate across all groups. However,
this approach still suffers in the attack detection rate. Despite
improvement in some groups, the average attack detection rate
TABLE IV. SVM results for S% = 60%.
Full Dataset Reduced Dataset
MD AD ED ND MD AD ED ND
ADR 57.8 77.8 75.6 64.4 95.6 100.0 100.0 95.6
FPR 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SA 89.4 94.4 93.3 91.1 98.9 100.0 100.0 98.9
TABLE V. SVM results for S% = 20%.
Full Dataset Reduced Dataset
MD AD ED ND MD AD ED ND
ADR 84.4 75.6 66.7 64.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
FPR 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SA 96.1 93.9 91.7 91.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Fig. 4. Average attack detection rate for SVM.
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Fig. 5. Average false positive rate for SVM.
only improves slightly. The maximum attack detection rate is
about 84.4% for MD group but the average attack detection
rate is around 73%.
As a summary, the results show that increasing the number
parameters (i.e., reducing the sensitivity degree) for anomaly
detection improves the performance of the system when
considering SVM as a classification algorithm. The reduced
feature set outperform the full dataset based approach in
all the testing scenarios. The result of 5 parameters based
approach are ideal but this approach is also least sensitive
to the attacks. The one parameter based approach is highly
sensitive to attacks but the suffers from low accuracy and
attack detection rate. Its performance can also be degraded
due to the noise which is quite common in industrial control
system. The 3 parameters based provide balance between the
sensitivity to attack and the performance characteristics. It has
ideal false positive rate, high accuracy, and attack detection
rate. The comparison of attack detection rate, false positive
rate, and accuracy between the reduced dataset and the full
dataset based approach are shown in Figure 4, Figure 5, and
Figure 6, respectively.
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Fig. 6. Average accuracy for SVM.
B. K-Nearest Neighbor (k-NN)
The results of each group considering one parameter based
approach are shown in Table VI. k-NN does not perform well
for either reduced dataset or full dataset based approach. The
attack detection rate is very low in both the cases. In reduced
dataset, the maximum attack detection rate is approximately
38%, which belongs to ED group. The achieved average
detection rate is 29%. The full dataset based approach follows
the same trend with average attack rate as 17% only. Beside
low attack detection rate, this approach also has considerable
high false positive rate for full dataset based approach. The
average false positive rate is 15.5% for reduced dataset based
anomaly detection whereas it reaches to 28% when full dataset
is used.
The results are considerably improved for reduced features
based approach when the number of parameters for anomaly
detection increased to three as shown in Table VII. The
maximum attack detection rate increased to 77.8% whereas
the average is improved to 74.4%. However, such attack
detection rate does not meet the safety requirement of real
industrial control systems. The full dataset based approach
still suffers from low attack detection rate. The average attack
detection rate is 26.67% with an improvement of about 10%.
TABLE VI. K-NN results for S% = 100%.
Full Dataset Reduced Dataset
MD AD ED ND MD AD ED ND
ADR 20.0 13.3 13.3 20.0 24.4 33.3 37.8 20.0
FPR 32.6 23.0 34.1 23.0 14.1 18.5 11.9 17.8
SA 55.6 61.1 52.8 62.8 70.6 69.4 75.6 66.7
TABLE VII. K-NN results for S% = 60%.
Full Dataset Reduced Dataset
MD AD ED ND MD AD ED ND
ADR 26.7 28.9 24.4 26.7 75.6 68.9 77.8 75.6
FPR 20.0 22.2 25.2 16.3 16.3 3.7 8.1 11.1
SA 66.7 65.6 62.2 69.4 81.7 89.4 88.3 85.6
100% 60% 20%
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Detection Sensitivity Degree (S%)
A
tta
ck
 D
et
ec
tio
n 
Ra
te
 (%
)
 
 
Full Dataset
Reduced Dataset
Fig. 7. Average attack detection rate for k-NN.
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Fig. 8. Average false positive rate for k-NN.
Similarly, the accuracy and the false positive rate also improve
in this approach. The minimum achieved false positive rate
for reduced feature set is 3.7% but average is 9.8%. The
average accuracy is improved to 86.25%. In case of full dataset
based approach, the average accuracy increased to 66% with
an improvement of 8%.
Similar to SVM, the proposed approach with feature re-
duction produce ideal accuracy, false positive rate, and attack
detection rate for S% = 20% as shown in Table VIII. As
all features are either in normal or anomalous region, this
results in high distance between the normal and the anoma-
lous classes. The full dataset based approach does not show
considerable improvement in the attack detection rate. The
maximum attack detection rate only improved by 2% whereas
the average attack detection rate is 29.4%. In this case, the
TABLE VIII. K-NN results for S% = 20%.
Full Dataset Reduced Dataset
MD AD ED ND MD AD ED ND
ADR 31.1 31.1 26.7 28.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
FPR 12.6 7.4 23.7 14.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SA 73.3 77.2 63.9 71.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
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Fig. 9. Average accuracy for k-NN.
attack trace consists of 18 parameters with 5 of them in the
anomalous region. The distance calculation between the testing
sample and the training data considers 13 normal features, this
results in choosing incorrect nearest neighbor. This is evident
due to decrease in the false positive rate. The average false
positive rate is 14.4%, the average accuracy is improved to
71.5%.
As a summary, k-NN results follows the same trend of
SVM and its results improved by increasing the number of
parameters. The average attack detection rate, false positive
rate, and accuracy are shown in Figure 7, Figure 8, and
Figure 9, respectively. The one parameter based approach does
not produce acceptable result neither from reduced dataset
nor the full dataset approach. The three parameters based ap-
proach shows improvement in the results. However, the attack
detection rate does not show much improvement with full
dataset. The attack detection rate for this approach continues
to suffer even with five parameters based approach. The attack
detection rate for the reduced dataset based approach shows
high improvement but may be not appropriate for industrial
application since the average attack detection rate is 74.4%.
The ideal results are achieved with reduced dataset and five
parameters approach.
C. C4.5 Decision Tree
The experimental results for the proposed approach with
one parameter based anomaly detection are summarized in
Table IX. The achieved average accuracy with reduced feature
set is 92.4%. The average accuracy suffers due to the low
accuracy of 88.3% in AD group. This implies that wrong
discriminating features are selected in the classification cri-
teria. In case of full dataset, the achieved average accuracy is
72.6%. Performance degradation is observed for MD group
as the detection accuracy dropped to 65%. Moreover, the
average attack detection rate for the reduced feature based
approach is 71.7%. The full dataset based approach achieved
a maximum attack detection rate of 20.0% with the average
detection rate of 15.0%. On the other hand, the false positive
rate is extremely low in all groups for reduced feature set based
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Fig. 10. Average attack detection rate for C4.5.
approach. This implies that the accuracy of this approach is
affected by the number of false positives. The average false
positive rate is 0.7%. In case of the full dataset based approach,
the average false positive rate is 8.1%.
The results are considerably improved by increasing the
number of parameter for anomaly detection to three as shown
in Table X. The average attack detection rate of the full dataset
based approach is improved to 51.7%. However, it still not
suitable for practical industrial control security solution. The
improvement in the attack detection rate is reflected to the
accuracy. The accuracy for full dataset based approach is
improved to 85.0%. The false positive rate dropped to 3.9%.
Similarly, the results for reduced feature set based approach
also improved. The average attack detection rate is 91.7%. The
accuracy is improved by 4.7% to be 97.1%. The false positive
rate is slightly increased to 1.1%.
The ideal results with reduced dataset are achieved with
five parameter based approach as shown in Table XI, which
is similar to SVM and k-NN results. The analysis of the
decision tree shows that the decision is based on the most
discriminating feature. This results in a small tree size with
a binary decision logic. The average attack detection rate
improved to 71.1% with highest attack detection rate in
TABLE IX. C4.5 results for S% = 100%.
Full Dataset Reduced Dataset
MD AD ED ND MD AD ED ND
ADR 15.6 13.3 11.1 20.0 80.0 53.3 73.3 80.0
FPR 18.5 0.0 2.2 11.9 1.5 0.0 0.0 1.5
SA 65.0 78.3 76.1 71.1 93.9 88.3 93.3 93.9
TABLE X. C4.5 results for S% = 60%.
Full Dataset Reduced Dataset
MD AD ED ND MD AD ED ND
ADR 55.6 44.4 46.7 60.0 100.0 86.7 91.1 88.9
FPR 0.0 8.9 5.9 0.7 4.4 0.0 0.0 0.0
SA 88.9 79.4 82.2 89.4 96.7 96.7 97.8 97.2
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Fig. 11. Average false positive rate for C4.5.
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Fig. 12. Average accuracy for C4.5.
ND group. The achieved average accuracy is also improved
to 87.8%. However, the false positive rate is increased to
6.7% when compare to three parameters based approach. The
average attack detection rate, false positive rate, and accuracy
are shown in Figure 10, Figure 11, and Figure 12, respectively.
The reduced features set based approach outperforms the full
dataset based approach in all test cases. The ideal results are
achieved with five parameters based approach but the three
parameters based approach gives the balance between the
performance and the sensitivity to attacks.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed an Anomaly Detection Sys-
tem (ADS) for industrial control system and evaluate its
performance. The novel component of this approach is the
TABLE XI. C4.5 results for S% = 20%.
Full Dataset Reduced Dataset
MD AD ED ND MD AD ED ND
ADR 73.3 57.8 68.9 84.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
FPR 9.6 0.0 3.7 13.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
SA 86.1 89.4 89.4 86.1 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
utilization of the physical parameters of the industrial process
to detect anomalies. The proposed ADS uses the threshold-
based anomaly detection technique as well as the inter-arrival
curves for extracting the high-level features from the data and
event traces, respectively. It builds a training model using these
features to reason about the corresponding features extracted
from the test trace. The system behavior is declared to be
normal if the event trace and the data trace pass the inter-
arrival curves test and the threshold-based test, respectively.
Otherwise, the behavior is considered anomalous.
The performance of the proposed solution enhanced by
using feature selection method to reduce the feature set for
anomaly detection. Support Vector Machine (SVM), k-Nearest
Neighbor (k-NN), and C4.5 decision tree algorithm are used
to train and test the proposed approach with the min and max
inter-arrival curves. SVM and C4.5 produced accurate results
even for high and medium sensitivity attacks. As compared
to this, k-NN was unable to produce good results for low
and medium sensitivity attacks test cases. The SVM based
approach achieved ideal results with three parameters based
approach, while k-NN achieved the same results with five
parameters based approach. It also has low false positive rate
and high detection rate as compare to k-NN. The study on
the industrial control system and the proposed ADS results
show that information about physical states of a process can
be utilized to develop a security solutions for industrial control
system.
The future work involves the testing of the proposed ADS in
different industrial control systems such as Oil and Gas indus-
tries. Future work involves the correlation of multiple anomaly
detection systems to increase the accuracy of the system and
testing the proposed approach on multiple industrial processes.
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